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Abstract

The 4th industrial revolution and its attendant technologies have given rise to many discussions
around the impact of technology on the rule of law. A fundamental premise of the rule of law is
that it requires an effective sovereign to establish formal legality. The sovereigns undertaking
this responsibility today are states. However, the digital spaces by their very nature challenge
the ability of states to do so. Digital spaces present challenges to traditional territorial notions of
jurisdiction resulting in their tendency to be “ungoverned”. Ungoverned digital spaces, as with their
physical counterparts, are spaces where the rule of law does not operate. Moreover, ungoverned
digital spaces can also impact governance in physical spaces. But not all states are equal, and each
has unique social contexts to grapple with. Thus, in considering the questions around technology
and the rule of law, it is necessary to consider the difference in contexts between states. Such
topics are also generally discussed from the perspective of developed and industrialized states,
where technology is most extensively developed and deployed. But the impact of the 4th industrial
revolution is not limited to the developed world, and communities in developing states constantly
engage with such technology, particularly with social media, even if such technology and platforms
are developed elsewhere. This paper considers the impact of digital spaces on the rule of law from
the perspectives of developing states, focusing on Southeast Asia.
Keywords: rule of law; technology; social media; developing states; jurisdiction
Abstrak
Revolusi industri ke-4 dan teknologi yang menyertainya telah memunculkan banyak diskusi
seputar dampak teknologi terhadap supremasi hukum. Premis mendasar dari negara hukum
adalah kebutuhan akan kedaulatan yang efektif untuk membangun legalitas formal. Negara
hadir sebagai penguasa yang bertanggung jawab. Namun, ruang digital pada dasarnya menjadi
tantangan tersendiri bagi negara. Tantangan ruang digital hadir pada gagasan teritorial
tradisional tentang yurisdiksi yang mengakibatkan kecenderungan mereka untuk “tidak diatur”.
Ruang digital yang tidak diatur adalah ruang di mana aturan hukum tidak ditegakkan. Selain
itu, ruang digital yang tidak diatur juga dapat memengaruhi tata kelola di ruang fisik. Tetapi
tidak semua negara adalah sama, dan masing-masing memiliki konteks sosial yang unik untuk
dihadapi. Jadi, dalam mempertimbangkan pertanyaan seputar teknologi dan supremasi hukum,
perlu dipertimbangkan perbedaan konteks antar negara. Topik seperti itu juga umumnya dibahas
dari perspektif negara maju dan negara industri, di mana teknologi paling luas dikembangkan
dan digunakan. Tetapi dampak dari revolusi industri ke-4 tidak terbatas pada negara maju, dan
masyarakat di negara berkembang terus-menerus terlibat dalam penggunaan teknologi tersebut,
terutama dengan media sosial, bahkan jika teknologi dan platform tersebut dikembangkan di
tempat lain. Makalah ini mempertimbangkan dampak ruang digital terhadap supremasi hukum
dari perspektif negara berkembang, dengan fokus di Asia Tenggara.
Kata kunci: supremasi hukum; teknologi; media sosial; negara berkembang; yurisdiksi.
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‘We have to be … modest in our pride in the rule of law.’1
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I. INTRODUCTION
American scientist Edward O. Wilson described the sum of humanity’s problems
as an unfortunate combination of our Palaeolithic emotions, medieval institutions,
with godlike technology.2 This paper explores the tension between the rule of law, an
institution finding its roots in the medieval Magna Carta3 on one hand, and the godlike
nature of the technologies of the 4th industrial revolution on the other, specifically
considering the impact of social media platforms and digital networks as a type of
‘ungoverned space’. This discussion focuses on the experience of Southeast Asian
states, intending to include the perspectives of communities outside of the ‘global
north, the ‘global north being the locus where such technology is most extensively
developed and deployed. Indeed, communities all over the world constantly engage
with social media, even if such technology and platforms are developed and deployed
from elsewhere.
The analysis first sets out, in Part II, the working understanding of the ‘rule of law’
for this discussion – as a kind of ‘machinery’ developed for a specific socio-political
context. This is a functionalist characterization of the rule of law, focused on what the
rule of law is intended to achieve and the role it plays, instead of the values and content
of the laws it upholds. The analysis then discusses a specific technical limitation of the
rule of law – that it can only operate within the specific organizational context of a
society where all legal subjects exist in a vertical relationship with sovereign power.
With this understanding in place, the question before us is whether and in what ways
technology has changed our social context such that the existing ‘machinery’ that is
the rule of law is not as effective as it ought to be in the prevailing context. To address
this question, Part III considers how digital networks and social media create spaces
that are ‘ungoverned’ and where the rule of law is unable to operate due to these
technical limitations. Part IV then considers the challenges posed by digital networks
from the perspective of developing states with different socio-technological contexts
from their counterparts in the global north. Specifically, technology developers are
more inaccessible, and existing technology is less applicable in their context, thus
making it more difficult for states in the global south to establish the rule of law in
light of digital spaces. Finally, this paper argues that it is necessary to consider if the
rule of law requires reconceptualization, and if so, the role of the ‘global south’ in
such discussions. These are ambitious queries and this paper cannot proclaim any
answer or solution to the questions presented. Its purpose is simply to provide a
starting point to the discussion on how, and in what ways, the rule of law should be
re-conceptualized to suit the prevailing technological context.

II. RULE OF LAW AS MACHINERY

The rule of law is an elusive concept and has no universally agreed definition.

Joseph Raz, “The Politics of the Rule of Law,” Ratio Juris 3 (1990): 339.
“Human Nature: Paleolithic Emotions, Medieval Institutions, God-Like Technology,” Science & the
Big Questions, accessed October 4, 2017, https://bigthink.com/videos/eo-wilson-what-makes-us-humanpaleolithic-emotions-medieval-institutions-god-like-technology.
3
Brian Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), 25.
1
2
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Fortunately, it is not necessary to delve into its competing definitions as our current
purpose is to consider how technology impacts the operation of the rule of law rather
than its embodied values.4 For this discussion, the rule of law is understood in terms
of what it is, what it does, and how, by considering its three core themes articulated by
Brian Tamanaha: First is that of the sovereign, that is the state and its officials, being
limited by law. To Tamanaha, this represents “the broadest understanding of the rule
of law, a thread that has run for over 2,000 years”,5 the goal of which is the restraint
of government tyranny. Second is that there is formal legality, embodying a “rulebound order established and maintained by government”,6 which in turn ensures that
the system is predictable. The third is that no one is “subject to the unpredictable
vagaries of other individuals”,7 and in this way, there is a rule of objective rule-based
law, as opposed to a rule of subjective and impassioned man. In considering these
three themes, Tamanaha notes that “all three takes on the rule of law… are open with
respect to content”,8 meaning that they do not impose requirements or expectations as
to what the law says, emphasizing that “neither democracy, nor individual rights, nor
justice is necessarily implicated in any of these themes”.9 Building on this analysis and
for purposes of this paper, the description of the rule of law afforded by the American
Jurist and legal academic Arthur L Goodhart is most relevant here – he describes the
rule of law as “machinery by which effect can be given to such basic rights as are
recognized in any particular legal system”.10
As a kind of machinery, the effectiveness and usefulness of the rule of law would
then be contingent on the prevailing context. Context matters to machines in two
ways: First, context determines the specific features of the system – as machines
are designed to fulfill certain functions and to meet specific needs, so too the rule
of law would have been established (and would subsequently evolve) to address the
needs, interests, beliefs, and attitudes of the time, specifically of those controlling the
structures of power. The rule of law is, as such, grounded in historical necessity.11
Second, context determines the specific limitations of the system – all machines have
limitations, and can only operate effectively under a specific range of circumstances,
beyond which they break or lose effectiveness. Joseph Raz alludes to this point in
stating that he does not regard the rule of law to be “a universal moral imperative.
Rather it is a doctrine which is valid or good for certain types of societies provided
they meet the cultural and institutional presuppositions for the rule of law, i.e. those
on which the rule of law depends for its success”.12 In other words, the rule of law can
4
This might include, for example, elements of “political morality” and “substantive notions of justice”
as discussed in Randall Peerenboom, “Varieties of Rule of Law: An Introduction and Provisional Conclusion,” University of California School of Law Asian Discourses of Rule of Law Research Paper no. 03-16 (Los
Angeles: Routledge Curzon, 2004): 4, and Simon Chesterman, “An International Rule of Law?” The American
Journal of Comparative Law 56, no. 2 (2008): 340.
5
Brian Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), 114.
6
Ibid., 119.
7
Ibid., 122.
8
Ibid., 140.
9
Ibid.
10
Arthur L. Goodhart, “The Rule of Law and Absolute Sovereignty,” University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 106, no. 7 (1958): 945 (emphasis added).
11
Brian Tamanaha explores the evolution of the law and political institutions through the social developments occurring from the Middle Ages through to the Enlightenment in Tamanaha, On the Rule of
Law, 29-31.
12
Raz, “The Politics of the Rule of Law,” 331.

Volume 11 Number 1, January - April 2021 ~ INDONESIA Law Review

THE TECHNOLOGICAL LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW

only function where the socio-political context is appropriate for it to do so.
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A basic contextual element fundamental to the rule of law, and which has informed
both its features and its limitations, is the existence of a single “sovereign” – an entity
whose “legal authority is not subordinate to any other authority while at the same
time it is superordinate over the authority of other associations which carry on
their affairs within the territorial boundaries of its jurisdiction”.13 If one accepts that
the rule of law has its roots in the Magna Carta,14 then the rule of law has indeed
only ever operated in the context where a sovereign, be it a monarch or parliament,
reigned supreme. The first two of Tamanaha’s themes of the rule of law discussed
above carry the implicit requirement of a sovereign – one that is limited by the law,
and that establishes the rule-bound order enabling formal legality. In our prevailing
context, the state is the sovereign that establishes the rule of law. The necessity of a
sovereign to the rule of law is further made obvious when considering its application
in international law: Simon Chesterman notes that ‘the historic challenge for the
rule of law [in the conduct of international affairs] has been its relationship to the
sovereign. In a domestic legal order the sovereign exists in a vertical hierarchy with
other subjects of law’.15 International law, however, is a matter of ‘peer polities’
instead, where there is no such sovereign, and hence no single dominant actor that
determines the interactions between states.16

With the 4th industrial revolution, is the current configuration of this ‘machinery’
that is the rule of law suited for our current socio-technological context? This line of
questioning demands that we scrutinize our assumptions about our socio-political
context that has made the rule of law an essential and successful principle (to varying
degrees) since medieval times. Of course, the socio-political context is not static, and
the context of jurisdiction might evolve such that the rule of law, where it might have
previously existed, ceases to be effective or to exist. This phenomenon is most acutely
observed in situations of conflict17 or political instability18 where a state’s institutions
are compromised, thus leading to a collapse of the rule of law altogether. But the
socio-political context can also change gradually, without any dramatic shocks to the
system. Since the beginning of the 19th century, observers have bemoaned the decline
of the rule of law in the west due to various social and political developments involving
the state. For example, Dicey viewed the “expansion of administrative action resulting
from the developing social welfare state”19 a dire threat to the rule of law, specifically

13
Anthony U. Ezebuiro, “Sovereignty and the Rule of Law,” Journal of Law and Global Policy 2, no. 1
(2017): 39.
14
While the ancient Greeks have been credited with developing the notion of the supremacy of law.
However Greek philosophy and codified Roman law were largely lost to the West during the first half of
the middle ages before being re-introduced around the same time as the Magna Carta. See Tamanaha, On
the Rule of Law, 18.
15
Chesterman, “An International Rule,” 350.
16
Andrew J. Taylor, “Thoughts on the Nature and Consequences of Ungoverned Spaces,” SAIS Review
of International Affairs 36, no. 1 (2016) (emphasis added).
17
Pwint Htun, “Beyond the Coup in Myanmar: ‘In Accordance with the Law’ – How the Military Perverts Rule of Law to Oppress Civilians,” Just Security, accessed April 28, 2021, justsecurity.org/75904/
beyond-the-coup-in-myanmar-in-accordance-with-the-law-how-the-military-perverts-rule-of-law-to-oppress-civilians/.
18
As noted by Randall Peerenboom: “Law has its limits, and so does rule of law, conceptually, normatively and practically. Rule of law assumes some degree of separation between law and politics… Revolutions and coups present a particularly difficult challenge for rule of law.” In ]Peerenboom, “An Introduction
and Provisional Conclusion,” 10.
19
Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law, 64.

Volume 11 Number 1, January - April 2021 ~ INDONESIA Law Review

~ 96 ~

HANNAH LIM

in respect of the separation of powers – a feature deemed necessary to the rule of
law’s machinery – as various government agencies were established to formulate and
execute on policy, while also adjudicating breaches of the same. While characterized
as representing the erosion of the rule of law itself, this phenomenon may be better
characterized as the socio-political context evolving beyond the original design of this
machinery, such that it is no longer able to operate as effectively.
In stark contrast to Dicey’s concerns of an expansionist state, digital spaces
challenge the rule of law by limiting the presence of the state by technological means.
This diminishes the state’s ability, where it is entitled to do so, to establish the formal
legality necessary to the rule of law. The next section provides a brief overview of the
nature of the digital spaces and identifies two challenges states face in attempting to
establish the systems and processes necessary to give effectivity to their legal systems
– first, is the difficulty in establishing a state’s jurisdiction over digital spaces as
traditional notions of “jurisdiction” tend to be conceptualized in physical, geographic
terms. Second, even where a state has jurisdiction (i.e. de jure authority) in respect
of such digital space, it may not have the technical capabilities to substantiate such
authority and give effect to its policies. The combined effect is that digital spaces
bear the characteristics of being ‘ungoverned’ and fundamentally without the rule
of law. The limitations of states in digital spaces are due to technical reasons rather
than any legal limit generated by society and its political institutions and processes.
This discussion thus focuses on the technological challenges posed by digital spaces
to governments in respect of establishing the rule of law and does not discuss
whether such state presence and intervention are desirable, or if they represent an
unwarranted overreach of state in a manner deleterious to the rule of law (i.e. where
they overreach legal limits). Such analysis is not within the scope of this study.

III.DIGITAL SPACES – NEW TERRAIN WITH NEW CHALLENGES

This section first considers the difficulty of traditional territorial approaches to
defining jurisdiction with respect to cyberspace, before considering the technical
difficulties states face in imposing their authority and giving effect to their policies
in respect of such spaces. As a result, such spaces can be characterized as being
‘ungoverned’, with implications for the rule of law and society, both on and off-line.
A. Challenges to Jurisdiction
It is not the purpose of this study to extensively consider the nature of jurisdiction
in digital spaces, but simply to highlight the technical challenges such domains pose
when establishing the rule of law. It is thus sufficient to note that online spaces are
a new form of terrain, wildly different from the physical geographical spaces that
have shaped how “jurisdiction” is conceptualized. Jurisdiction over digital spaces is
conceptually difficult as the historical narrative is that “land and territory are so closely
associated with the notion of the state they are seldom analyzed separately”.20 In
essence, “the power of a sovereign to coerce compliance with legal rules by exercising
physical dominion over person or property became the central organizing principle
of jurisdiction”.21 Persons and property are necessarily tied to place. This is not to
suggest that states do not actively or successfully regulate digital spaces where it is
20
Andrew J. Taylor, “Thoughts on the Nature and Consequences of Ungoverned Spaces,” SAIS Review
of International Affairs 36, no. 1 (2016).
21
Allen R. Stein, “The Unexceptional Problem if Jurisdiction in Cyberspace” The International Lawyer
32, no. 4 (1998): 1169 (emphasis added).
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unclear where the relevant persons or property (including intangible property such
as IP rights) might “be” in terms of place. States retain de jure authority over online
spaces and the various actors that create, operate, and use them. For example, the
app/platform providers that create such spaces might be entities incorporated under,
and hence subject to, the laws of a specific state. The relationship they have with their
users is contractual, articulated by the “terms of use” and “community standards”
that users agree to, which are in turn subject to state laws on contract formation and
enforcement. The operation of such platforms and the activities thereon are also
subject to state laws, whether in respect of digital concerns (such as data protection
laws) or general concerns (such as the prevention of hate speech or the publishing of
prohibited content, regardless of medium).

Nevertheless, establishing jurisdiction still requires a nexus between the event
that occurred in digital space and physical territory or the nationality of the parties
involved. While arguably the development of “neo-territorialist”22 jurisdictional
rules which predate cyberspace provide a “more-or-less coherent approach to
the allocation of judicial authority over cyberspace controversies”,23 such neoterritorialist approaches continue to tie jurisdiction to a place, albeit “measured by a
more complex relationship with the defendant than simply the location of his body”.24
The challenge to the rule of law is due to the increased complexity of the relationships
involved in digital space which are in turn driven by the nature of the technology that
gave rise to the digital interaction in question. This complexity creates uncertainty
as to whether and which state has jurisdiction over whatever hardware, software,
transaction, interaction, or any of the other numerous constituent components to the
platform and the activities it enables. If the rule of law can only be established by a
sovereign in respect of its own jurisdiction, then it follows that the rule of law is weak
in the digital spaces where state jurisdiction is uncertain.

Even where states have clear jurisdiction and authority, at least two other issues
arise with respect to the rule of law in digital spaces. First is the balkanization of
legal regimes in cyberspace, resulting in unequal legal protection between different
users occupying the same digital space (potentially linked to any number of physical
places), depending on the sovereign power responsible for their wellbeing. For
example, when GPDR came into force, Facebook and Microsoft seemed to move nonEU users to contract with their American entities such that non-European users
outside of the EU would be governed by more lenient US privacy laws instead.25 The
second issue is that it is more difficult for a state to effectively exercise power over
its jurisdiction in digital spaces than in physical spaces. States typically have direct
access to physical spaces to the extent permitted by law and can directly intervene
in physical spaces to attain policy goals. For example, to protect personal safety, a
state may directly intervene in a physical space by installing fences, streetlights, and
surveillance cameras, in addition to penalizing persons who commit crimes. But states
typically cannot directly intervene in the design of systems, algorithms, and code in
digital spaces in the same way, especially if they lack the requisite technical expertise
to understand how such systems and algorithms operate. They are limited to indirect
approaches of governance via apprehending the persons who commit crimes in such
Ibid., 1170.
Ibid., 1191.
24
Ibid., 1170 (emphasis added).
25
David Ingram, “Exclusive: Facebook to Put 1.5 billion Users Out of Reach of New EU Privacy Law,”
Reuters, accessed April 19, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-privacy-eu-exclusive/
exclusive-facebook-to-put-1-5-billion-users-out-of-reach-of-new-eu-privacy-law-idUKKBN1HQ00P.
22
23
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spaces (if they can identify and assert jurisdiction over such persons) or mandating
and relying on other actors (such as the app developers and coders) to implement
the necessary safeguards. This assumes that such actors are accessible to them in
the first place and that governments can articulate, in technical terms, the specific
obligations such actors are expected to undertake. The battle between Apple and the
American government over the encryption of data on Apple devices26 is an example of
this dynamic, albeit in respect of physical devices. Without commenting on the merits
of Apple’s commitment to privacy, this example demonstrates that without access
to equally sophisticated and expensive technological know-how,27 or unless such
technology developers agree to co-operate, a state has limited power to determine
how such platforms are operated and the interactions thereon.

Thus, even where governments have clear jurisdiction and de jure authority over
digital spaces, there are practical and technical limitations with respect to the exercise
of such authority. This directly impedes the ability of states to establish at least the
second of Tamanaha’s core theme of the rule of law, formal legality, as discussed
above. A fundamental attribute of formal legality is that of generality whereby “the
law applies, without exception, to everyone whose conduct falls within the prescribed
conditions of application”.28 The balkanization of the jurisdiction in respect of digital
spaces, coupled with the different capacities of states to enforce the different rights
afforded to users from their jurisdiction contravenes this attribute of generality
specifically in respect of a user’s engagements in digital space.
B. Ungoverned Digital Spaces

The lack of clarity around jurisdiction in cyberspace, and the technical challenges
states face in asserting and substantiating jurisdiction claimed, renders digital
platforms a type of ‘ungoverned space’.29 “Ungoverned space” traditionally refers to
physical places where “poor governance [has led] the populations of these spaces to
render themselves ungovernable by the existing central state”30 and thus, “rule of law
serve(s) little or no function”.31 As more aspects of social, political, and economic life
are carried out on digital platforms, the absence of the rule of law in respect of such
interactions is cause for concern. In unpacking the ungoverned nature of digital spaces
it is important to recognize that un-governmentality does not exist in the absolute,
neither does it “imply a power vacuum because there may be different forms and
levels of authority exercised by nonstate actors”.32 Thus, un-governmentality persists

26
Thomas Brewster, “U.S. Launches Fresh Assault On Apple’s ‘Warrant-Proof Encryption,’” Forbes, accessed January 7, 2020, https://flipboard.com/@forbes/the-us-just-launched-a-fresh-assault-on-apple-swarrant-proof-encryption/a-SKbujwL8RqWbUwN64cUZ1w%3Aa%3A3199486-ea0ab00f31%2Fforbes.
com.
27
Thomas Brewster, “Immigration Cops Just Spent A Record $1 Million On The World’s Most Advanced iPhone Hacking Tech,” Forbes, accessed May 8, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2019/05/08/immigration-just-spent-a-record-1-million-on-the-worlds-most-advanced-iphonehacking-tech/?sh=5bba345e5a0a.
28
Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law, 66.
29
Hannah Lim, “Technology and International Law - An Emerging Markets Perspective,” Australian
International Law Journal 25 (2018): 25.
30
Taylor, “Thoughts on the Nature.”
31
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, “The Link Between ‘Ungoverned Spaces’ and Terrorism: Myth or
Reality?” (United Kingdom: Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2014), 5.
32
Nicholas Tsagourias, “Non-State Actors, Ungoverned Spaces and International Responsibility for
Cyber Acts,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 21, no. 3 (2016).
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in varying degrees and various forms, depending on the nature and interactions of
the various actors jostling for authority and influence over such spaces. Perhaps the
most powerful non-state actors in online spaces are the numerous corporate entities
that develop and operate the platform. By virtue of having created such spaces and
via various design features and IP protection frameworks, these entities collectively
control these digital spaces and the interactions thereon. This represents a shift in
the balance of power in favor of technology developers, in respect of such spaces,
such that the two elements of an effective sovereign,– power and authority – are
bifurcated and vested in different entities, thus giving digital spaces the quality of
being ”ungoverned”.

The discussion thus far has been limited to interactions within digital spaces
and does not consider how such dynamics in digital space might impact physical
spaces.33 As with physical ungoverned spaces, the impact and ramifications of poor
governance in the digital realm do not stop at the metaphorical border that separates
the digital world from the physical. In the 1990s, at the dawn of the internet age,
observers expected that “our understanding of cyberspace as a discrete place,
separate from the molecular world, will eventually give way to a more sophisticated
understanding of the Internet as an extension of the broader culture and economy”,34
and that “just as the culture of the Internet becomes permeated by real-world culture,
the technology of the Internet falls into place as yet another source of information
in the real world”.35 It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider this in-depth,
but a few preliminary observations are offered. For example, the use of algorithms in
recommendation systems and aggregators on social media have been known to result
in ‘filter bubbles and proliferation of fake news, disinformation and propaganda [that
affect] the capacity of individuals to form and develop opinions, receive and impart
information and ideas and thus impact our freedom of expression’.36 Such trends
are driven by private sector actors that prioritize revenue maximization with little
regard to whether the content distributed “is objective, factually true, diverse or even
relevant”.37 This gives rise to concerns of “risks of bias and unequal representation
of opinions and voices”,38 in turn heightening the risk of voter influence, threatening
democracy and fair elections. While these developments do not directly impact the
rule of law as conceptualized in its three core themes, they nevertheless shape the
social context and the issues that the rule of law is intended to address. These changes
to the social context in the physical world could result in the relative weakening, and
thus a perceived erosion of, the rule of law.
Thus, Part III of this paper has provided an overview of the nature of digital
spaces that render it difficult for states, as sovereigns in respect of their jurisdiction,
to establish the rule of law – first is the difficulty of conceptualizing jurisdiction
over digital spaces to effectively address the concerns arising from interactions in
cyberspace. These difficulties subsist even with “neo-territorialist” jurisdictional
rules, due to the complexity of the relevant relationships established in respect of
33
This is analogous to how ungoverned spaces in the physical world “encourage failure in vulnerable
states [and]… can transmit unrest from a singular ungoverned space to neighbouring states” as mentioned
in Taylor, “Thoughts on the Nature.”
34
Stein, “The Unexceptional Problem,” 1174.
35
Ibid., 1175.
36
Catelijne Muller, The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Human Rights, Democracy, and the Rule of
Law (Report, Ad Hoc Committee on Artificial Intelligence, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2020): 33.
37
Ibid., 30.
38
Ibid., 45.
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digital platforms. This results in the balkanization of jurisdiction. The second is that
even where jurisdiction is clear, states are not always able to directly intervene in
digital spaces as the power to manage digital platforms and the interactions thereon
vest in the non-state entities that create them. Thus, digital spaces can, to varying
degrees, be considered a kind of “ungoverned space” where the rule of law does not
apply. Ungoverned spaces further impact physical spaces, potentially harming the
social context within which the rule of law operates.
These issues represent a displacement of the state as an effective ”sovereign”,
particularly in respect of digital spaces. In this regard, it is important to recognize
and consider that “not all states within themselves are equal in either power or
effectiveness”,39 a fact sometimes obscured by the principle in international law of
formal equality across states. As such, the “machinery” of the rule of law of different
states would differ, each having been adjusted and adapted (with varying degrees of
success) to respond to the context and the demands of the community. Part IV of this
paper considers the experience of developing states with respect to digital spaces
and the technology that enables them, presenting a few examples from Southeast
Asia. This is to expand existing discussions around technology and the rule of law
to include the experience of the global south, as such discussions generally take the
perspective of developed and industrialized states, where such technology is most
extensively developed and deployed.

IV. THE PERSPECTIVE OF DEVELOPING STATES

The issues pertaining to jurisdiction and the creation of ungoverned digital spaces,
as discussed above, are due to a shift in the nature of technology. While technology
development before the internet was limited generally to goods, services, and systems
with a connection to and dependency on the physical world,40 technological innovation
today is distinctly divorced from it. For example, AI exists in software and requires
little physical infrastructure to develop and deploy.41 With the rise of the internet,
such technology can be easily accessed anywhere with an appropriate device (such as
a smartphone) and internet connection. But despite its virtually incorporeal nature
and ubiquity of use, AI still requires extensive capital (including intellectual capital) to
develop – thus “many AI-applications are developed and deployed by only a handful
of large private actors”42 in the global north,43 with far-reaching effects throughout
the globe. This section considers two dynamics that arise from the current structures
of technological development and deployment. First is that, despite the jurisdictionconfounding nature of digital platforms, the persons and property of technology
producers still exist in the physical world in specific geographic clusters, rendering
Taylor, “Thoughts on the Nature.”
For example, the mass production of goods, the development of nuclear and military technology,
space exploration, and transportation improvements.
41
Matthew U. Scherer sums up AI’s attributes as follows: “AI research and development may be
discreet (requiring little physical infrastructure), discrete (different components of an AI system may be
designed without conscious coordination), diffuse (dozens of individuals in widely dispersed geographic
locations can participate in an AI project), and opaque (outside observers may not be able to detect potentially harmful features of an AI system)“ Matthew U Scherer, “Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems:
Risks, Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies,” Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 29, no. 2 (2016):
355.
42
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them inaccessible to the governments of developing states. Second, because of this
distance and inaccessibility, technology developed in the global north is not always
applicable to the context in the global south, resulting in even fewer opportunities for
governments of developing states to familiarise themselves with and adapt to such
technology. Finally, this section considers how the offline implications of ungoverned
digital spaces may manifest in more worrisome outcomes in the global south.
A. Inaccessibility of Technology Producers

As mentioned, the developers of most cutting-edge technologies are typically
located in the global north. Thus, governments in developing states have fewer avenues
for engagement with such developers. This dynamic persists despite such technology
and platforms being deployed in their jurisdictions. In the case of social media, there
is already a general concern across governments from all jurisdictions that “political
power is concentrated in a few private hands which prioritise shareholder-value over
the common good”.44 This concern is magnified in situations where “the common good”
of a community is obscured to remote developers unfamiliar with local dynamics,45 and
where regulators are unable to hold such organizations to account. The proximity (or
relative lack thereof) of governments to the powerful private technology developers
also impacts the former’s ability to understand and manage such technology and its
risks.46 In this manner, social media platforms and other AI algorithms developed in
the global north can erode a developing state’s ability to manage events within their
jurisdiction if they remain inaccessible and hence unavailable for dialogue.
While states can always shut off access to such platforms in an ostensible bid
to protect their communities, doing so is politically difficult. Such measures would
be decried, and likely rightly so, as an attack on freedom of speech and access to
information. Users in such states would also suffer, as their lives have undoubtedly
improved because of such platforms47 that provide superior alternatives to
traditional, physical modes of interaction, communication, and accessing information,
marketplaces, and financial services. While such technology platforms provide
undoubted benefits, lack of oversight and accountability may still result in negative
outcomes that manifest more acutely in developing states. In unpacking this problem,
the relative and specific forms of inaccessibility faced by different state governments,
with respect to such technology giants, must be considered. This would paint a more
accurate and nuanced picture about the quality and nature of the sovereign power
of such states – particularly of the power they have (or do not have) over foreign
actors that exercise considerable influence on the affairs within their jurisdiction. For
example, the ethnic violence that broke out in Myanmar in 2014 has been directly
attributed to the spread of misinformation on Facebook. Yet, despite the gravity of
Muller, The Impact of Artificial Intelligence, 52.
An example is perhaps the violence between Uber and the traditional taxi drivers arising when the
ride-hailing app came to Bali, disrupting unspoken rules of the trade structured, in part, to support local
communities. See Harrison Jacobs “Why Should We Make Foreigners Rich? Taxi Drivers Are Taking on Uber
and Grab in Bali, and Some Are Turning to Violence,” Business Insider, accessed June 23, 2018, https://
www.businessinsider.com.au/uber-grab-bali-attacks-taxi-drivers-2018-6.
46
Hannah Lim, “Technology and International Law,” 35.
47
For example, the Myanmar government has restricted internet access in parts of the Rakhine state
in response to the ongoing conflict resulting in “restricted access to health information, undermining efforts to limit the spread of the coronavirus”. The Asia Foundation, Violent Conflict, Tech Companies, And Social Media in Southeast Asia: Key Dynamics and Responses (Washington DC: The Asia Foundation, 2020), 24.
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the situation, and the enormity of influence Facebook had in Myanmar (as it was
at that time “synonymous with the internet”),48 government officials were unable
to contact Facebook with their concerns leaving the government with no choice
but to block access to Facebook in Mandalay. While this ended the clashes, it finally
caught the attention of Facebook officials, who were “concerned over the site being
unreachable”.49 While Facebook has dramatically improved its responsiveness
since 2014, this example demonstrates that in the absence of effective systems of
accountability specifically designed for the context of developing states, engagement
between these governments and foreign technology giants would be dictated, almost
entirely, by the latter.

Even where such entities are accessible to governments in developing states, the
latter may be hesitant in establishing effective protections for their communities
if this might impact national competitiveness: As of September 2019, apart from
Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, “the remaining countries in
ASEAN do not have overarching regulatory frameworks for data protection”,50 with
weak regulatory mechanisms scattered across different legislation. This is in part
attributable to the power imbalance between these foreign technology giants and the
state: being a developing region with a burgeoning but nascent digital economy which
promises to whisk the region out of its developing status, “ASEAN probably cannot
afford to impose harsh punishments like those contained in the [European Union’s
General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’)] as its digital economy is just beginning
to take off.”51 As a result, the regulatory frameworks of developing states are likely
to be less robust than those in the global north. Usually, it is the legislation of a more
powerful sovereign (usually from the global north) that forces technology companies
to improve standards for everyone, resulting in a kind of ‘trickle-down’ governance
effect. While better than nothing, relying on such ‘trickle-down’ governance alone is
unsatisfactory if the values and norms (e.g. privacy, data projection, or digital and
communication rights)52 asserted by such regulations do not address the needs of, or
are incongruence to, communities in developing states. With respect to the [GDPR]
for example, commenters have noted that it is “about consent and it’s an approach
to privacy that is very European… It’s a values statement”.53 In addition to the
questions of which, what and whose norms and values ought to govern online spaces
(and for which the lack of coherance leads to the balkanization of the jurisdiction in
cyberspace), the current discussion on how such norms and values would be given
effect in online space must also be considered. The latter requires consideration as
to whether the mechanisms and machinery for legal redress are available in their
jurisdictions, and to what extent they are effective. For example, users relying on
48
Timothy Mclaughlin, “How Facebook’s Rise Fueled Chaos and Confusion in Myanmar” Wired, accessed June 7, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/how-facebooks-rise-fueled-chaos-and-confusion-inmyanmar/.
49
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accessed September 3, 2019, https://www.financierworldwide.com/the-eu-gdprs-impact-on-asean-dataprotection-law#.YOFNZxMzZbU.
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See for example Minna Aslama Horowitz, Hannu Nieminen, and Amit M. Schejter, “Introduction:
Communication Rights in the Digital Age,” Journal of Information Policy 10 (2020): 299.
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“trickle-down governance” to safeguard their wellbeing in cyberspace are unlikely to
obtain any meaningful judicial redress considering the cost barriers and challenges of
navigating a foreign legal system.
B. Inapplicability of Existing Technology to Local Contexts

The challenges discussed above are compounded by other factors such as language,
cultural and wealth differentials, which operate as barriers to a state effectively
managing digital spaces. Taking AI as an example, its development today is “based on
the needs and values of nations in which AI is being developed… [and] without control,
research on AI is expected to be directed towards AI applications where funding and
commercial interests are” – in developed nations.54 Its relevance and applicability
in other contexts, such as in developing states, are secondary considerations to the
profit-seeking goals of private sector developers. Even where there is dedicated
effort to develop solutions for developing states, contextual factors can operate as
barriers to the adoption and deployment of some types of technology. An example
is neural machine translation: use cases relating to human languages are not easily
transplantable to countries with languages that are less common. Researchers note
that many of the Southeast Asian languages are “low-resource” and “compared
to the West, Asian languages have different sources and the spectrum is diverse.
The characters of Asian languages are complicated. The lack of corpus also causes
difficulties.”55 This does not yet account for the additional technical complexities of
the linguistic and cultural diversity within states. Southeast Asia is one of the most
diverse places in the world56 making it difficult to effectively adopt or adapt such
technology and its applications domestically. This results in even fewer opportunities
for a state government to engage, and become familiar, with such technology.
Less exposure to such technology translates to fewer resources to develop an
effective understanding of technology-related concerns, and to learn to manage the
ensuing implications. But despite this, the technology is still extensively deployed in
these jurisdictions by the private sector through e-Commerce, ride-hailing, and gaming
platforms, and of course, social media.57 This gap between the expertise and capacity
of the regulators on one hand, and the extensive use of the technology by the public
on the other, can give rise to a responsibility deficit over the digital space created
and the interactions thereon. As mentioned above, this is likely to have a greater
impact on communities in developing states, as weaker states struggle to assert their
authority over transactions and interactions in the digital realm. In some cases, and
despite this dynamic, the technology is nevertheless being transplanted and deployed
54
As discussed in Ricardo Vinuesa, Hossein Azizpour, Iolanda Leite, Madeline Balaam, Virginia Dignum, Sami Domisch, Anna Felländer, Simone Daniela Langhans, Max Tegmark, and Francesco Fuso Nerini,
“The Role of Artificial Intelligence in Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals,” Nature Communications 11 (2020): 233.
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Gino Diño, “The State of Neural Machine Translation for Asian Languages,” Slator, accessed April 23,
2019, https://slator.com/features/the-state-of-neural-machine-translation-for-asian-languages/.
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Rich Morin, “The Most (and Least) Culturally Diverse Countries in the World,” Pew Research Center, accessed July 18, 2013, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/07/18/the-most-and-leastculturally-diverse-countries-in-the-world/#:~:text=The%20only%20western%20country%20to,the%20
world’s%20least%20diverse%20countries.
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Letter Over Data Leak,” The Parrot, accessed April 10, 2018, https://parrotnewsonline.com/.
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by governments of developing states. An example is Myanmar’s facial recognition
cameras that were deployed in Naypyitaw by the civilian government a couple of
months before the military coup of February 2021. The technology implemented
was foreign, provided by China’s technology giant Huawei, and the project was
implemented by two Myanmar private sector companies. In discussing the project,
a senior advisor for the Naypyitaw Safe City project suggested that responsibility for
the security of the system rests with the companies: “the good thing is if something
happens, it’s the companies’ responsibility and there’s no need for concern”.58 It is
therefore unclear how familiar the civilian government was with the technology, how
much control it has over its use, and whether it was equipped to manage potential
implications that could arise.
But despite such dynamics of inaccessibility, and the barriers to understanding
and adoption, fluency in the technology is nonetheless demanded from governments
in the development and deployment of tech-enabled government services to their
citizens. This is fast becoming the baseline expectation of digital populations familiar
with online platforms. Failure to do so represents a failure of the state in maintaining
its capacity and erodes public confidence in institutions. In respect of the rule of law
and the justice system, Richard Susskind raises this concern in the context of courts,
in that

“it is… hard to conceive for a truly sustainable court system that is not technologically
in tune with the communities that it serves. A system whose foundations lie in a printbased world… will soon be out of step with the daily lives of citizens of a digital society.
This incompatibility will… reduce confidence in the justice system…”.59
Thus, the current dynamic of the social systems of technology, as discussed above,
of who is developing, deploying, using, and regulating technology in developing
countries is more likely to result in these state governments being less effective than
their developed counterparts both in managing the attendant risks of technology
and delivering public services to their populations in a manner that retains public
confidence.
C. Impact on Physical Spaces

As governments in developing states are less effective in both managing
technology and harnessing the power of technology to improve engagement with
their citizens, they are then also more likely to leave digital spaces ungoverned. While
the ungoverned nature of digital spaces and the impact this may have in the physical
world is of concern everywhere, developing states may suffer more extreme outcomes
due to the prevailing socio-political contexts of their communities. For instance, most
post-colonial Southeast Asian states struggle with “ethnic factionalisation”.60 This is
in part due to unique historical and socio-political features such as ‘divide and rule’
approaches to the colonial administration,61 which means that at their inception, the
58
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nation-states of Southeast Asia comprised of various ethnic groups between whom
mistrust and suspicion had been engineered, deliberately or otherwise. Furthermore,
the borders of these states were determined along colonial boundaries with ‘little or
no linguistic and ethnic relevance’,62 and at the time when the right of colonization
and territorial conquest was extinguished in international law, ensuring that
“those inherited borders became sacrosanct and border changes correspondingly
difficult”. 63 This “[created] potential for conflict based on territorially geographically
concentrated disaffected minorities” seeking for the right of self-determination in
the post-colonial, modern, world.64 In addition, the institution of the “nation-state”
expected to unite these various ethnic groups, manage the conflicting demands for
self-determination, and establish justice and the rule of law, was “unlike any political
entity that had previously existed in the region”,65 with little continuity to the precolonial political structures in the area.66

These dynamics would result in the states having, as a starting point, little
moral legitimacy and authority in the eyes of significant segments of its population,
potentially resulting in the rise of organized groups antagonistic to the state. The
impact of ungoverned digital spaces must be considered in such a context, particularly
as online spaces can provide the infrastructure, sources of income, and invisibility to
such groups – features that have made physical ungoverned spaces conducive for the
proliferation of destabilizing forces.67 Indeed, insurgent groups can leverage digital
infrastructure to bolster their position, via encrypted communication platforms and
clandestine fundraising. Moreover, the spread of hate speech and misinformation
geared toward mobilizing popular support against the authority of the state is cause
for concern.68 This dynamic, enabled by digital spaces, has already resulted in forms
of organized mass violence in Southeast Asia.69

Consideration must also be given to state responses to such developments. States
typically respond to challenges to their authority with a show of force. This dynamic
applies also to online spaces where “[g]overnment-led conflict mitigation often
involves the policing or militarization of online spaces”.70 An example is in Myanmar
in the context of the current military coup – without recognizing the Myanmar
military (the Tatmadaw) as the government, security forces at checkpoints would
demand civilians to show their Facebook profiles and arrest those with anti-military
Historical Society 8 (1998): 339. In some cases, such as the case of the British in Myanmar, there may not
have been an ostensible colonial policy to divide and conquer. Nevertheless, the immediate consequences
of the colonial legacy might have been separatism as observed in Samara Yawnghwe, Maintaining The
Union of Burma 1946-1962: The Role of the Ethnic Nationalities in a Shan Perspective (Bangkok: Institute of
Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University 2013), 68-77.
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posts for the spread of misinformation. The military further uses social media
platforms to track and target its critics.71 But in using power to substitute (rather
than substantiate) authority, a state is “bound to fail because not at all times are
coercive power necessary and irresistible”.72 Indeed the use of force to “[maintain]
cohesion too often degenerates into coercion, thereby accelerating fragmentation
and frequently ultimately to dissolution of existing governance.”73 The substitution of
brute force for authoritative legitimacy to maintain the vertical relationship between
the sovereign state and other legal actors is an affront to the first of Tamanaha’s
themes of the rule of law which requires that the sovereign is limited by law. This also
generates and contributes to social instability that threatens to compromise the state
institutions necessary to the rule of law and the overall wellbeing of the population.
For example, “in Southeast Asia, where conflicts frequently stem from grievances
against an overbearing or authoritarian state, policing the internet can exacerbate
the cycle of violence and severely limit civil liberties”.74 In some instances, states
“have also launched sophisticated operations employing disinformation
techniques to spread messages via fake Facebook accounts and false news stories—in
some cases intentionally inflaming communal violence against religious minorities,
and in other cases undermining democratic processes”.75

The foregoing suggests that another contextual factor to consider is the internal
dynamics of the state itself. States are seldom monoliths and the relationship and
dynamics between different functions of government, between which the state’s
authority and power are distributed and constantly negotiated, should be considered.
In the context of Southeast Asia, the role of the military and its antagonistic
relationship with civilian governments is also a result of the historical context of ethnic
factionalization, incongruous borders, and the extractive and coercive governance
systems of the preceding colonial powers. These are dynamics that discussions on
technology, the state, and the rule of law must consider, not least because of the
increasing use of technology in the military context.76
This is not to pass judgment on the merits of the claims of any such group or the
decisions of governments as they grapple for control over technology and its effects.
The purpose of this example is simply to highlight the importance of understanding
digital trends and their impact in their specific socio-political contexts, particularly
where such dynamics differ from that in the global north. From such an understanding,
we ought to then consider how best to adapt the current construction of the rule of
law so that it can be applied effectively to online spaces, bringing the individuals and
their interactions under the protection of the rule of law and enhancing the quality of
governance over such spaces.
71
“Five Killed in Myanmar Protests as Junta Cracks Down on Online Critics,” Reuters, accessed April
3, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-idUSKBN2BQ031.
72
Anthony U. Ezebuiro, “Sovereignty and the Rule of Law” Journal of Law and Global Policy 2, no.
1(2017): 36-40.
73
Taylor, “Thoughts on the Nature.”
74
Ibid.
75
Benjamin Lokshin and Adam Burke, “In Southeast Asia, Violent Conflicts Move Online,” The Asia
Foundation, accessed October 28, 2020, https://asiafoundation.org/2020/10/28/in-southeast-asia-violent-conflicts-move-online/.
76
For example, the February 2021 military coup in Myanmar will have far-reaching implications on
the use of Huawei’s facial recognition cameras in Naypyitaw. How will the government’s use and engagement with such AI, and with Huawei as service providers, evolve should Myanmar revert to military rule?

Volume 11 Number 1, January - April 2021 ~ INDONESIA Law Review

THE TECHNOLOGICAL LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW

~ 107 ~

V. CONCLUSION: THE SOCIO-TECHNOLOGICAL LIMITS OF THE CURRENT
CONSTRUCTION OF THE RULE OF LAW
At the dawn of the internet age in the 1990s, observers on jurisdiction and
cyberspace noted with optimism that “as courts become more familiar with the
technology [of cyberspace], we can expect more sophisticated refinements [in
determining jurisdiction over cyberspace issues]”.77 This comment underscores the
importance of access to and an in-depth understanding of, to the point of familiarity
with, the technology to effectively address questions around jurisdiction in digital
platforms. Thus, whether a state possesses, or has access to, such technical know-how
is directly relevant to whether such state will be able to develop sufficient oversight over
such areas of digital spaces where it ought to have jurisdiction. From this perspective,
the gap in the effectiveness of developed versus developing states becomes clear:
unlike their counterparts in the global north, regulators in developing states have
more barriers in accessing such information and technical knowledge, they are less
likely than their developed counterparts to be able to effectively articulate, define
and assert jurisdiction over digital spaces. This paper has argued that the difficulty of
establishing the rule of law in a world where digital spaces are becoming increasingly
important is due to the inability of states to operate as sovereign in respect of the digital
realm. This inability is not due to legal limits determined by appropriate political
processes but is instead due to the technological limits arising from the technology of
the 4th industrial revolution. These limits manifest more acutely in the global south
due to the current social context of how technology is developed and deployed. This
is in line with Catelijne Muller’s stipulation for a thorough understanding of the local
context when assessing risks around AI, as articulated in their report to the Council of
Europe’s Ad Hoc Committee on AI:
“AI systems are more than just the sum of their software components. AI systems
also comprise the socio-technical system around them. When considering governance,
the focus should not just be on the technology, but also on the social structures around
it: the organizations, people, and institutions that create, develop, deploy, use, and
control it and the people that are affected by it, such as citizens in their relation to
governments, consumers, workers or even entire society”78
Not without irony, and if the inherent weakness of the state vis-à-vis technology
remains unaddressed, developing states may represent the future of the global
north in this new socio-technological context, instead of being “backward” as often
construed by prevailing discourse. In the case of the Cambridge Analytical scandal,
for example, it was the Philippines “high social media usage and lack of regulation
[that made] it lucrative for a company like Cambridge Analytica to test out strategies
before implementing them in Western countries with tighter regulations.”79 The
weaker capacities of developing states “creates an ideal petri dish type situation…
where you can experiment on tactics and techniques that you wouldn’t be able to as
easily in the West… if it does work, then you can then figure out how to port that into
other countries”.80
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How would such weaknesses be addressed? The traditional approach to rectifying
deficiencies in governance is state-building. However, state-building to address
concerns in physical ungoverned spaces has generally proven unsatisfactory.81
Moreover, while state (re)construction is traditionally described “as a transition from
de jure to de facto statehood”,82 building state capacity to effectively govern online
spaces requires the development of de jure authority over such spaces in addition to
de facto power. As demonstrated above, de jure authority over the digital realm is not a
given. More importantly, state-building does not address the fundamental incongruity
between existing notions of jurisdiction – entrenched in physical geographic terms –
and the demands of justice in the socio-technological context of a borderless digital
world that is rapidly gaining influence. In light of these observations, doubts have
been raised as to whether the nation-state, with its medieval equipment such as the
rule of law, is the appropriate institution to take us forward into a future shaped by
technology.83 Can our existing institutions continue to bring justice and afford us the
same protections and benefits as originally intended? The foregoing analysis suggests
that they may not.

The fundamental problem is that this technology, along with the trending sociotechnological context, disrupts the vertical relationship sovereign states should
have with the other legal actors impacting its jurisdiction - ranging from the foreign
technology giants to local insurgent groups and individual users wherever they may
be. If the vertical relationship cannot realistically be restored, then it is necessary
to ask if our current construction of the rule of law has run its technological limits?
This should not be a surprising question as all systems and conceptions have their
limitations, and the rule of law as we know it today was developed within a specific
technological context, to address the requirements of a certain era, using tools and
frameworks available at that time. We must pay attention to ‘the historical and
political context within which the rule of law was developed’,84 and have the courage
to recognize when structural and systemic changes render the current framework
inappropriate for our needs.
This is not to suggest that we abandon our values and aspirations of what we
expect the rule of law to deliver, but rather we must consider what new systems and
processes to develop to ensure that these expectations can be effectively met within
our new socio-technological context. The approach proposed by Simon Chesterman
in crafting an “international rule of law” is helpful, where they call for a “functionalist
understanding of how and why the rule of law is used – as distinct from the formal
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understanding of what it means”.85 Framing the rule of law as “a tool”,86 a means to a
separate and distinct end, or a piece of machinery as done so here, allows us to consider
how the institution was designed to achieve specific goals for a specific context. We
can then consider how it might be re-designed to address the unique concerns arising
in our different, and constantly evolving, contexts. While it is beyond the scope of this
paper to articulate the precise contours of such re-design, considering Tamanaha’s
three core themes of the rule of law as discussed in the introduction can serve as
a useful guide. Possible approaches to re-designing the rule of law may include, for
example, determining how best to strike the balance between a government limited
by law, yet sufficiently empowered to effectively govern technological development
and deployment in the prevailing context. What configurations of government (statelevel, supranational, or networked) might be best suited to these tasks? Should the
notion of jurisdiction evolve beyond territorial, and even neo-territorial, notions to
enable such a government to be effective? On formal legality, questions around how
to ensure generality, equality of application, and certainty for all users, regardless of
where and who they are, can be considered. Considering the remoteness of technology
developers and the corporations that deploy them, this may require transferring
the burden of accessing the legal remedy from the user to the platform providers.
Finally, the third theme may be expanded to read “rule of law, not man, nor algorithm”,
raising considerations as to how to ensure that the decisions and processes that are
entrusted to objective reason (represented by the law) and not to subjective passion
(represented by man) also not usurped by opaque systems remotely developed to
maximize profit. On the other hand, it is also useful to consider how such technology
can be a meaningful resource to enhance and expand the coverage, and improve the
effectiveness, of the rule of law in both digital and physical spaces.

The foregoing questions suggest that the rule of law may require extensive redesigning, particularly with respect to the role and nature of the sovereign, and
conceptions around jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the rule of law is not an immutable
principle and Part II above has already alluded to the fact that the rule of law also
has the capacity to evolve if it is to be able to adjust to the changing context. Since its
medieval beginnings, the rule of law has changed substantially over time to adapt to
fluid social, political, and economic requirements. Indeed, this has been the case since
its very inception with the Magna Carta, which started out as “the effort of nobles
to use law to restrain kings’ and eventually evolved ‘into the symbol of the struggle
against arbitrary power”.87 In addition to this evolution, the rule of law has also
been consciously and actively adapted in attempts to transplant the rule of law, with
varying degrees and definitions of success, in connection with various state-building,
development, and capacity-building initiatives in the global south. Indeed the debates
in the global south on what the rule of law means and the values it ought to represent
and attempts at developing ”autochthonous”88 conceptions of the rule of law are
manifestations of communities attempting to build the legal machinery effective to
their respective specific contexts. These communities are rich in experience and can
provide fresh and useful perspectives to our current global challenges.
In closing, the rule of law was developed in a specific temporal, political, social,

Ibid., 359.
Ibid.
87
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and technological context, to address the needs and aspirations of its time. The task
for our technological milieu includes recognizing when the current configuration of
this institution can no longer achieve its stated goals and met our expectations. We
therefore must build, and learn how to build, new institutions appropriate to our
context. This could include reconceptualizing the rule of law to apply to contexts where
there is no exclusive or clear sovereign. In doing so, we can learn from developing
states, whose development journeys and present struggles with technological trends
are both lessons in institution building, and heuristic devices to challenge inherent
and misleading assumptions of the nature of technology and its relationship with our
governance and justice systems.
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